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THE LIMITS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN A
MUNICIPAL FISCAL CRISIS
I. Introduction
Municipal fiscal crises are becoming more frequent, causing the
tradition of local control to be questioned. The problems plaguing
New York City are but one example of this nation-wide trend.
In order to aid the City in overcoming its fiscal crisis, New York
State has created two novel agencies, the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC)" and the Emergency Financial Control Board.2
MAC's major purpose is to aid the City in meeting its financial
requirements,3 while the Control Board's main function is to moni-
tor the City's spending.4 One accomplishment of these two organiza-
tions has been the implementation of drastic austerity measures
that have gone far towards remedying the City's fiscal situation.5
Thus far, both MAC and the Control Board have successfully
withstood several court challenges. However, the powers of these
agencies raise certain questions concerning the limits of state con-
trol over a municipality in a fiscal crisis.7 Furthermore, there is the
additional question of whether the City has the power to implement
certain of the measures ordered by MAC and the Control Board.'
This Note will examine the legal bases for the creation of these
agencies and evaluate the City's ability to comply with their direc-
tives.
1. New York State Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws chs. 168-69
(McKinney 1975) (codified at N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3001-40) (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet
1975).
2. Act of Sept. 9, 1975, N.Y. Sess. Laws chs. 868-70 (McKinney 1975). [hereinafter cited
as Emergency Act].
3. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3031 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet 1975).
4. Emergency Act ch. 868 § 7.
5. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
6. Wein v. State of New York, No. 58 (Ct. App. March 23, 1976); In re Subway-Surface
Supervisors Ass'n, 175 N.Y.L.J. 12 (Sup. Ct. March 3, 1976); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Munici-
pal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Flushing Nat'l Bank
v. City of New York, 174 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1975).
7. See section II infra.
8. See section III infra.
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II. State Intervention in a Municipal Crisis
A. The Scope of a Municipality's Autonomy
It is generally agreed that a municipal corporation such as New
York City derives its power from two possible sources: the State
Constitution and acts of the State Legislature.'
At one time, there was a third theory concerning the source of
local authority. This doctrine was called "the inherent right of self-
government" 10-a belief that local government historically has its
own rights, needing neither constitutional nor statutory authoriza-
tion to exist. In 1923, the United States Supreme Court rejected this
theory.I
The dominant view of municipal corporations at the present time
is that they are "mere subdivisions" of the state and may thus do
only that which the State allows. 2 In Atkin v. Kansas '3 the Su-
preme Court accepted this view of municipal government. Atkin
concerned a Kansas statute which restricted the working hours of
municipal employees in Kansas cities and towns. The Supreme
Court upheld the statute, reasoning that since each municipality
exists subject to the will of the state, the state could determine city
policy as it saw fit. 4 It deemed the authority of state over city
absolute, "being subject only to the fundamental condition that-the
collective and individual rights of the people of the municipality
shall not thereby be destroyed."'"
9. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Vanlandingham].
10. See People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 12-13, 59 N.E. 716, 719 (1901);
Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N.Y. 459, 467, 45 N.E. 15, 17 (1896).
11. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). The Court held that "[in the absence
of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent
right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control of the State." Id. at 187
(footnote omitted). Interestingly the issue in Trenton was freedom to contract. The Supreme
Court held that freedom to contract did not operate in behalf of governmental agencies and
political subdivisions, such as municipal corporations, so as to inhibit the legislature from
limiting or prohibiting their right of contract. Id. at 192. See also Minot Special School Dist.
No. 1 v. Olsness, 53 N.D. 683, 208 N.W. 968 (1926).
12. See Vanlandingham, supra note 9.
13. 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
14. Id. at 221-22.
15. Id. at 221; accord, Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898); Barnett v. Denison,
145 U.S. 135, 139 (1892); United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1872);
cf. Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) where the Court held that a municipal
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Although the language of Atkin broadly limits local autonomy, a
municipality does have certain rights which the state legislature
may not abolish, i.e. those granted directly by the state constitu-
tion. 6 These direct grants of power are known as "home rule" provi-
sions. While an exact definition of "home rule" has never been
universally accepted, one popular definition says it is "the auton-
omy of local government in the sovereign state, over all purely local
matters." 7
B. State Powers v. City Powers
The focal point of the state-city relationship is the extent of the
state legislature's superior authority over the municipal corpora-
tion.
1. MAC and the Emergency Financial Control Board
After months of unsuccessful attempts to restore investor confid-
ence in New York City, Governor Carey proposed a plan calling for
a partial State takeover of the task of financing the City. The result-
ing June, 1975 legislation created MAC. 8
In return for marketing bonds and for supplying the City with
short-term financing, MAC called for certain fiscal restraints by the
City. MAC retained the right to review the municipality's financial
records in order to ascertain whether those restraints were in fact
being implemented. 9 Although disagreement over budgetary policy
did not materialize, 0 the MAC legislation provided remedies if the
City did not agree to the fiscal changes MAC deemed necessary.2
corporation has no privileges or immunities which it may invoke against state legislation
affecting it.
16. It has been observed that "[i]f a power is conferred on a municipal corporation by a
provision of the state constitution, the legislature has no power to impose restrictions or
limitations on that power." 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.06, at 21 (3d ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN]. See Baldwin v. Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 173, 160
N.E.2d 443, 445, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1959).
17. MASS. SEN. Doc. No. 950, at 35 (1965) (Report Relative to Home Rule).
18. New York State Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws chs. 168-69
(McKinney 1975) (codified at N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3001-40 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet
1975)).
19. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3039 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet 1975). The section provides
that MAC may conduct periodic review of the city's records, accounts, budgets, forecasts,
etc., using its own or state employees as reviewers. The city officers and employees are to
cooperate fully with the MAC reviewers and are to always be available to MAC. Id.
20. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
21. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3040 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet 1975) provides: (1) for
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Those remedies, though ambiguous in part, made clear MAC's par-
amount authority over the municipality's expenditures.22
Within two months after its creation, MAC experienced difficulty
in selling its bonds. The financial community was apparently un-
moved by the austerity measures worked out by the City and
MAC. 3 To meet the newest financial difficulties, the Governor pro-
posed legislation which would help finance the City, but which re-
quired a virtual takeover of the City's budgetary powers. In Septem-
ber, 1975, this legislation was signed into law.24
The resulting law provided short-term funding for the City and
created the Emergency Financial Control Board,25 a state-
dominated group consisting of the Governor, the State and City
Comptrollers, the Mayor, and three appointees of the Governor. The
purpose of the Board was to develop a financial plan in conjunction
with the City. It had ultimate "rights of approval, disapproval and
modification."2 Whereas MAC has no express right to modify finan-
cial plans,27 the Emergency Control Board was given specific powers
to implement its own ideas of fiscal constraint.2" All city contracts
were to comply with the Control Board's financial plan;29 and if they
failed to meet with board approval, they were voided.' Municipal
prompt submission of an expense report by the City to MAC; (2) that if such report reflects
a policy not agreed to by the MAC Board of Directors, the Board shall promptly notify the
Mayor for the purpose of reviewing an alternate policy; (3) if corrective action is not taken,
the MAC Board shall send a "determination of noncompliance" to the Governor, the Legisla-
ture, the State Comptroller, the Mayor, Board of Estimate, City Comptroller, and the City
Council and shall disclose such determination to the public; and (4) MAC may exercise all
rights and remedies provided by law.
22. The remedies available to MAC in the event of the Mayor's refusal to accede to MAC's
conditions are no doubt intentionally unclear. Particularly unclear is the idea that MAC has
all rights and remedies provided by law. Since the MAC legislation was without actual
precedent, the drafters no doubt were leaving an avenue available for imposing MAC's bud-
getary will on the City of New York, without specifically detailing what that avenue was or
could be. See id. § 3040(4).
23. The austerity plan included a wage freeze for municipal employees, elimination of
many positions, a transit fare increase, and a reduction in the City University budget. N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
24. Emergency Act.
25. Id.
26. Id., ch. 868 § 2(§7(1)(a)(iv)).
27. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
28. Emergency Act, ch. 868 § 2 (§8(3)(e)).
29. Id. § 2 (§ 7(1)(e)).
30. Id. § 2 (§ 7(1)(e)(iii)).
NOTES
employees' salary increases were suspended;3' all expenses required
approval of the Control Board. 2 Furthermore, the Control Board
was authorized to receive all City funds; and, having a practical
stranglehold on the City, could virtually supersede the municipal
government as sole comptroller of City finances.33
Such provisions are of questionable constitutionality. The legality
of "fiscal emergency" legislation depends, to a large degree, on
whether the state constitution has a "home rule" provision, and, if
it does, the scope given it by state courts.34
2. Home Rule and the Right to Self-Government
Home Rule powers differ from other municipal powers because
they are derived from a state constitution and therefore cannot be
subverted at will by the state legislature.
The New York Home Rule provision, Article IX of the State Con-
stitution, provides that "[aill officers of every local government
whose election or appointment is not provided for by this constitu-
tion shall be elected by the people of the local government, or of
some division thereof, or appointed by such officers of the local
government as may be provided by law. '35 The powers, duties,
qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal, terms of
office, and compensation of municipal officers and employees are
within the municipal corporation's authority.36 The most debated
part of New York's Home Rule law states that matters concerning
the "property, affairs or government" of the municipality are exclu-
sively local and subject to the municipality's control. 37
31. Id. § 2 (§ 10(1)).
32. Id. § 2 (§ 11(1)). Section 11(3) provided a penalty of suspension for non-compliance.
Section 41-a appoints a special deputy comptroller for the City of New York to assist the
Control Board, There are many other provisions of the Act which are not germane to this
discussion.
33. See id. § 2 (0 7(1) (2)).
34. See generally H. McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1st ed.
1916); Vanlandingham, supra note 9.
35. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b) (officer provision).
36. Id. § 2(c)(1). This section while giving the municipality control over its officers and
employees does not specifically exclude state control.
37. Id. § 2(b) ("property, affairs or government" provision). Section 2(b)(2) provides that
in order for the State legislature to pass bills concerning the "property, affairs or government"
of a municipality, the Mayor must specifically request such special legislation.
An interesting question concerns such a request by the Mayor. What standards are to be
used regarding the request? Caparco v. Kaplan, 38 Misc. 2d 1058, 237 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup.
1976]
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People ex rel. Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham" is an early
case which illustrates the general scope of the "officers" provision.
In Pelham the New York Court of Appeals held that a state-created
tax act, passed specifically for Westchester County,"5 violated home
rule by removing from Westchester's local officers a right associated
with local self-government,' i.e. the right to the local assessment of
property values. The court interpreted the "officers" provision of
the constitution as including not only the right to elect local officers,
but the right to preserve their traditional powers and functions, so
long as such powers remained local in nature.
In defining the practical usage of the home rule provision, New
York courts have limited the application of the "officers" provision
to cases where traditionally local powers have been seized from local
officials, only to be given to existing state officials who subsequently
exercised them.4 This limited application was demonstrated by
judicial refusal in People v. Bradley" to apply the "officers" provi-
sion to the case of a state officer whose position encompassed "new"
local duties.43
Bradley involved a legislative act creating a railroad terminal
commision for the City of Buffalo. The City contended that the
state-appointed commission usurped powers normally associated
with local officials, thereby violating the "officers" provision. The
court of appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that commission
members were "new officers" with "essentially new duties" and
therefore they did not substantially interfere with the autonomy of
Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 20 App. Div. 2d 212, 245 N.Y.S.2d 837 (4th Dep't 1964)
held that an attack made on legislation on the grounds of an inadequate request by the Mayor
was prohibited. A request such as a city message is not subject to review on the ground that
the alleged necessity provoking the request did not exist or was not properly established by
facts recited. Id. at 1066-67, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57.
38. 215 N.Y. 374, 109 N.E. 513 (1915). The act took the task of collecting taxes from
individual towns and gave this assignment to a receiver who would be responsible for the
collection of all state and local taxes. Id. at 378, 109 N.E. at 514.
39. Id. at 377, 109 N.E. at 513.
40. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
41. See, e.g., County of Cayuga v. McHugh, 4 N.Y.2d 609, 152 N.E.2d 73, 176 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1958); Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. City of New York, 152 N.Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499
(1897).
42. People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N.Y. 592, 101 N.E. 766 (1913).
43. Id. at 620, 101 N.E. at 775.
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local officials." The court distinguished between the performance of
"essentially new duties," meaning that the essence of the officer's
job is new, and the performance of most of a local officer's former
duties. 5
MAC and the Control Board do not appear to be entirely consis-
tent with prior law concerning the "officers" provision of the state
constitution. By taking final budgetary power from the municipal-
ity, the legislature may well be violating what one court has called
"the obvious purpose" of the home rule law, the right to have local
offices administered by locally elected officers.46 Furthermore, the
characterization of MAC and the Control Board as "new officers"
performing" "new duties" to circumvent the "officers" provision of
Article IX is strained. Even with the temporary nature of MAC and
the Board, it can be argued that they perform only functions pre-
viously performed by city officials and they reduce the powers of
those local officials substantially."
The legislation creating MAC and the Control Board should also
be examined in respect to the "property, affairs or government"
provision of the constitution.49 Under this provision, a court must
decide what is a substantially local concern, and what is of state-
wide significance.
In Baldwin v. City of Buffalo the court of appeals held a local
44. Id.
45. Id. For a later affirmation of this distinction, see Prescott v. Ferris, 251 App. Div. 113,
295 N.Y.S. 818 (4th Dep't 1937), which involved the creation of a Tax Review Board for the
City of Syracuse, by the State Legislature. The court held that since the board members
would be assuming duties previously performed by city assessors the board members in effect
would be city officers and under the "officers" provision, city officers cannot be appointed
by the state. Id. at 116-17, 295 N.Y.S. at 823. See also People ex rel. Met St. Ry. v. Tax
Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 435, 67 N.E. 69, 72 (1903), aff'd, 199 U.S. 1 (1905); People v.
Raymond, 37 N.Y. 428 (1868).
46. People ex rel. Williamson v. McKinney, 52 N.Y. 374, 378 (1873). However, courts have
said that subject to constitutional restrictions, the legislature may do what it thinks best with
a public office or officer. Koch v. City of New York, 152 N.Y. 72, 46 N.E. 170 (1897); Nichols
v. MacLean, 101 N.Y. 526, 5 N.E. 347 (1886); Long v. City of New York, 81 N.Y. 425 (1880).
47. People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N.Y. 50 (1873).
48. Id. at 56-57. See also Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 183 N.E.2d 670, 229 N.Y.S.2d
380, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 74 (1962) which stated that the purpose of the home rule
provision is to preserve for the cities, towns, and villages the right to select their local officers
with the general functions associated with such offices. Id. at 325, 183 N.E.2d at 674, 229
N.Y.S.2d at 386.
49. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
50. 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
1976]
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law involving alteration of city council ward boundaries to be within
the home rule constitutional provision guaranteeing local control
over the "property, affairs or government" of a municipality. In
determining whether an act is local, the court reasoned that weight
should be given to historical considerations, and it concluded that
councilmanic boundaries were traditionally within the exclusive
province of local authorities.'
In Adler v. Deegan5" a multiple-dwelling law was held to be a
statewide concern and therefore not violative of home rule. While
admitting the difficulty in allocating interests between the state and
municipality, Chief Judge Cardozo stated that the maintenance of
life and health is always a state concern, even though its effect is
essentially on the municipality.53 That court did, however, clearly
limit its holding to the social element; the need for adequate hous-
ing.
Another case frequently cited to show the breadth of state concern
is Robertson v. Zimmermann54 which involved the state's creation
of a sewer authority for the City of Buffalo. That case, however, is
clearly distinguishable from New York City's predicament. Not only
was public health, rather than fiscal integrity involved, but there
was no violation of the "officers" aspect of home rule since all mem-
bers of the Sewer Authority were to be appointed by the Mayor of
Buffalo.
Courts outside New York have been inconsistent in determining
what is a local and what is a statewide concern. For example, in
some courts the environment has been called a statewide concern,55
while "zoning" has been characterized as local.5" As a further exam-
ple of confusion, the regulation of a police force has been categorized
as both.57
Similar problems have plagued courts in trying to determine
51. Id. at 173-74, 160 N.E.2d at 445-46, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
52. 251 N.Y. 467, 485, 167 N.E. 705, 711 (1929).
53. Id. at 485, 167 N.E. at 711 (concurring opinion).
54. 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
55. Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
56. See Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. Brighton, 49 App. Div. 2d 273, 374 N.Y.S.2d
510 (4th Dep't (1975)).
57. Compare Popljer v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 56 P. 53 (1899) with Lossman v. Stockton,
6 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 P.2d 397 (3d Dept. 1935). See Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
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what acts affecting municipal employees are of local concern. Gen-
erally, the decision in each case depends upon which aspect of mu-
nicipal employment is involved. Most home rule decisions have con-
cluded that hours, wages,5" qualifications, and appointment are
local concerns.59 But, the characterization of municipal employment
as a whole has been far from uniform.A0
The unusual quality of the City's current plight must always be
noted. Cases allowing the state to enact legislation in traditional
areas such as police, fire protection, and health, usually involved
state attempts to regulate or bolster the services.6' Fiscal
emergencies have never before been so extreme; and, the issue has
never before been considered in the context of state regulation to
enhance the general welfare. 2
Undoubtedly, there is an enormous difference between allowing
a state to set minimum qualifications for a police officer, and allow-
ing the state to fire him. If one assumes that the fiscal integrity of
a subdivision is a legitimate state concern, does that necessarily
negate the municipality's uniquely local concern for the protection
of its own citizenry? Adler v. Deegan stated that "health and
safety" is always a state concern regardless of home rule.63 But that
case and all others like it dealt with protecting "health and wel-
fare," not with decreasing such protection through making and
breaking municipal employee contracts. 4 A new problem arises
then in defining "health and welfare." For the present, it appears
that fiscal stability is being given priority over municipal services.
Suits challenging the emergency legislation have been directed at
specific provisions rather than the entire statutory scheme. 5 More-
58. Holland v. Bankson, 290 N.Y. 267, 49 N.E.2d 16 (1943); Allmendinger v. City of New
York, 182 Misc. 142, 46 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 691, 54 N.Y.S.2d
392 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 644, 64 N.E.2d 712 (1945).
59. 1943 N.Y. Arr'y GEN. Op. 419.
60. Compare Caparco v. Kaplan, 20 App. Div. 2d 212, 245 N.Y.S.2d 837 (4th Dep't 1964)
(municipal civil service is a matter relating to the "property, affairs, or government of a city")
with Buffalo v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 80 Misc. 2d 741, 363
N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975)
(paramount authority in relation to municipal employees is in the State Legislature).
61. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
62. See Section III infra.
63. 251 N.Y. 467, 475, 167 N.E. 705, 708 (1936).
64. See Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912).
65. See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
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over, they have been based on state and federal constitutional provi-
sions other than "home rule." 6
Thus far, this litigation has been unsuccessful. The suspension of
the City's right to collect sales and use taxes was upheld as consis-
tent with the City's responsibility to appropriate sufficient money
to meet its credit obligations." In a New York Court of Appeals
decision, the state's constitutional prohibition against state loans or
gifts was found not applicable to the lending of state funds to the
City.6 Finally, suits brought under impairment of contract theories,
have unsuccessfully challenged the moratorium on the enforcement
of city notes69 and the suspension of wage increases for public em-
ployees.7" In upholding these two procedures, courts have taken ju-
dicial notice of the City's fiscal emergency and the implicit power
of the State to safeguard the public welfare. 7
At least one court has recognized the connection between the
State's financial well-being and that of the City's fiscal crisis.72
When confronted with this notion, home rule arguments become
somewhat untenable. Once the actions of a municipality have state-
wide effect, they can no longer be defended as local in nature. This
may account for the absence of home rule arguments in the suits
brought against MAC and the Control Board. However, it cannot
be gainsaid that traditional notions of "home rule" have been un-
dermined by the creation of both agencies.
66. See, e.g., Wein v. State of New York, No. 58 (N.Y. Ct. App. March 23, 1976). (N.Y.
CONST. art. VII, § 8 which provides that credit of the State shall not "be given or loaned to
or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation .... "); In re Subway-Surface
Supervisors Ass'n 174 N.Y.L.J. 12 (Sup. Ct. March 3, 1976) (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 which
prohibits a state from enacting a law impairing contract obligations; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7
which prohibits impairment of pension benefits for public employees).
67. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. City of New York, 174 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1975).
68. Wein v. State of New York, No. 58 (N.Y. Ct. App. March 23, 1976).
69. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d
978 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
70. In re Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n, 175 N.Y.L.J. 12 (Sup. Ct. March 3, 1976).
71. E.g., id., Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379
N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
72. Wein v. State of New York, 84 Misc. 2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, No. 58 (Ct. App.
March 23, 1976). The court observed:
The amelioration of a State financial crisis arising from the City's financial difficulties
is a proper State purpose which justifies the State in borrowing money to meet what
the Legislature regards as a State emergency.
Id. at 459.
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III. Fiscal Crisis, City Powers, and the Municipal Worker
A large part of New York City's budget consists of labor costs.
Therefore, in seeking ways to reduce expenditures, the City has
eliminated various municipal employee positions.
With limited exceptions, an employer can fire an employee at will
absent contractual or statutory protection." The municipal em-
ployee is no exception to this rule. However, most municipal em-
ployees in New York State are protected by the Civil Service Law74
and therefore cannot be individually discharged unless the employer
complies with certain procedures.75 It has long been held proper to
abolish positions due to economic reasons."
A. Collective Bargaining Law
A less settled question, however, is whether a municipality may
abolish jobs protected by collective bargaining agreements.77 One
possible source of authority is the Collective Bargaining Law7 of the
New York City Administrative Code which covers employee nego-
tiations with the City. Generally the law refers to ordinary labor
negotiations and therefore would not appear relevant to austerity
cutbacks.79 However, section 1173-4.3(b) does allow the city to "re-
lieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or other legiti-
mate reasons . . . ,, 0 In DeLury v. City of New York,"' an action
brought on behalf of the Uniformed Sanitation Association to enjoin
the City from laying off sanitation men, the City argued that "lack
of work" includes an implication of "lack of funds" as a legitimate
reason for firing servants.2 The supreme court agreed, stating that"
73. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895). The
employer, however, may forfeit this right if the dismissal was done in bad faith, with malice,
or as a retaliatory measure. Mange v. Beebe Rubber Co., - N.H. -. , 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
74. N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW art. 5 (McKinney 1973), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1975).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Allen v. Lindsay, 66 Misc. 2d 705, 321 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Wiptler
v. Klebes, 164 Misc. 220, 298 N.Y.S. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1937), rev'd, 260 App. Div. 228, 22
N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't), rev'd, 284 N.Y. 248, 30 N.E.2d 581 (1940).
77. See text accompanying notes 78-124 infra.
78. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-1.0-13.0 (1975).
79. See, e.g., id. §§ 1173-4.2 (good faith bargaining), 1173-5.0 (union certification), 1173-
7.0 (mediation and impasse panels).
80. Id. § 1173-4.3(b).
81. 83 Misc. 2d 202, 371 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1975), afi'd, 51 App. Div. 2d 288, 381
N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep't 1976).
82. 48 App. Div. 2d at 605, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
83. 83 Misc. 2d at 208, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
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[tihere can, of course, be no question that the unprecedented financial crisis
facing the City is a "legitimate reason" under Section 1173 of the Adminis-
trative Code upon which to base the layoffs being made by the city.
Section 1173-4.3(b) may not be as supportive of the City's position
as the court suggests. It addresses the scope of management rights
in collective bargaining and itemizes those areas which are within
the City's perogative.5 4 It is clear therefore, that the City could
refuse to bargain on job security, but once a job guarantee is pro-
vided in a contract it is not so obvious that the City may use section
1173-4.3(b) to remove it.85
A similar issue has been litigated in several cases outside New
York City where the administrative code is not controlling.88 These
cases have raised the question whether an austerity cutback of posi-
tions is subject to arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and have turned on whether austerity cutbacks or staff size
are permissible terms or conditions of employment. 7
A lower court hearing a case involving the abolition of school
district positions held that "[t]he creation and abolition of posi-
tions within a school district, in good faith, are functions of boards
of education."88 The court reasoned that under the State Civil Ser-
vice Law the reduction of a work force for economic reasons does not
constitute a term or condition of employment and is not a proper
subject of a collective bargaining agreement since "[tihe Board of
Education may not delegate its authority [to an arbitration panel]
84. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54 § 1173-4.3(b) (1975).
85. See DeLury v. City of New York, 48 App. Div. 2d 595, 378 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't
1975). Judge Murphy in his dissent stated:
But even assuming, arguendo, as the city contends, that lack of funds is the statutory
equivalent of "lack of work" . . . we do not read [section 1173-4.3(b)] as prohibiting,
either explicitly or by plain and clear language, an agreement providing for secure
employment for a specified term. At most, subdivision b of section 1173-4.3 of the
Administrative Code permits the city to refuse to bargain on a term agreement with-
out fear of incurring sanctions for the commission of an improper practice.
Id. at 605, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (citations omitted).
86. See, e.g., Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers
Ass'n., 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975); West Irondequoit Teachers
Ass'n. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974); Board of Educ. v.
Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17
(1972).
87. 37 N.Y.2d at 617, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
88. Carmel Central School Dist. v. Carmel Teachers Ass'n, 76 Misc. 2d 63, 66, 348
N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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to create or abolish positions."89
This position was seemingly overruled by the New York Court of
Appeals in Susquehanna Valley Central School District v. Susque-
hanna Valley Teachers Association.0 There a grievance contesting
the school district's elimination of positions was held arbitrable by
the court.' Chief Judge Breitel distinguished between issues which
must be addressed in collective bargaining and those which may be
a subject of bargaining at the discretion of the parties.2 Calling
"staff size" a legitimate issue which may be negotiated at the bar-
gaining table, the court held the elevation of positions to be arbitra-
ble."'
In a recent case before the appellate division, however, the rule
of Susquehanna was ignored. Schwab v. Bowen94 involved a con-
tract which specifically excluded economy or abolition of position
as grounds for dismissal."5 The lower court decision holding good
faith austerity cutbacks not to be arbitrable" was upheld. Relied on
for authority in that case were two decisions by the New York State
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) which, according to
the court, held that the reduction of a work force for economic
reasons does not constitute a term or condition of employment and
is not a proper subject for a collective bargaining agreement."' How-
ever, the Schwab court clearly misunderstood the PERB decisions
which said that the job reduction issue is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The Board did not say that:it was not a proper subject
for an agreement, but rather held that the parties could voluntariy
agree to include such a provision. 8 This is of course consistent with
the Susquehanna rationale. Nevertheless the Schwab court, in
89. Id.
90. 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
91. Id. at 617, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
92. Id.
93. Id. See also Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282
N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
94. - App. Div. 2d __, 379 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'g 80 Misc. 2d 763, 363
N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
95. 80 Misc. 2d at 764, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
96. Id. at 766, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
97. In re Yorktown Faculty Ass'n, 7 N.Y. PERB 4503 (1974); In re City of White Plains,
5 N.Y. PERB 3008 (1972).
98. In re Yorktown Faculty Ass'n, 7 N.Y. PERB 4503, 4513-14 (1974); In re City of White
Plains, 5 N.Y. PERB 3008, 3014 (1972).
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reaching its decision, ignored the distinction between subjects
which cannot be negotiated and those which are proper but not
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Since Susquehanna and Schwab
seem to be in direct conflict,99 a clarification by the court of appeals
is no doubt imminent.
B. Emergency Powers
An alternative source of authority for abolishing municipal em-
ployee positions is a municipality's "emergency powers."'"" This
theory allows a mayor, in a time of crisis, to impose sanctions other-
wise not within his authority.'"' The theory is an adjunct of a city's
"police power" and its duty to maintain the health, welfare, and
safety of its citizens."2 The limits of this doctrine have yet to be
determined.
The New York City Administrative Code contains an "emer-
gency" provision, but this section concerns measures to guard
against "an act of violence or a flagrant and substantial defiance
. . .of public authority . . . ."Il Taking the words of the Code at
face value, it would seem that "emergency" includes only physical
threats to the well-being of the City."4
Apart from the possible assertion of the "emergency powers"
theory,1'0 the Mayor may make massive cutbacks under a the-
ory of "police power."'05 These powers permit severe measures in
99. One important difference between Schwab and Susquehanna is that the former in-
volved a municipality in fiscal crisis, while the latter did not. There may indeed be a different
attitude on the part of the court of appeals when the contracting city is having severe fiscal
problems.
100. See Eagen v. Beame, 174 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1975); In re Vizzini, 174
N.Y.L.J. 13 (Sup. Ct. July 8, 1975).
101. See Eagen v. Beame, 174 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1975).
102. "While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for
the exercise of power." Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
103. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN CODE § 8a-5.0 (1971).
104. That such emergency powers refer only to threats of physical violence and not fiscal
crisis is implied by section 8a-8.0 of the Administrative Code which allows emergency mea-
sures to last only fifteen days (although renewable), clearly not the amount of time needed
to deal with a fiscal emergency. Furthermore, the kinds of remedial measures called for in
section 8a-6.0 such as the imposition of curfews, controls on liquor and on guns, do not
encompass reactions to a fiscal crisis.
105. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 108-14 infra.
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order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the
municipality. 17
The exact breadth of a city's "police power" in a period of fiscal
crisis remains unclear.' No doubt the resolution will turn on
whether a budgetary problem, as opposed to a physical threat, is one
that affects the "welfare" of the citizenry. Modern authority adopts
a broad reading of "police power."'' 9 Whether such a broad interpre-
tation is applicable to a fiscal crisis is a question which has not yet
been answered."10
The New York General City Law provides that municipal cor-
porations have only those powers expressly granted to them or im-
plied from those expressly granted."' Courts have disagreed on the
interpretation and applicability of these provisions in relation to the
"police power" theory. One court has held that city contracts must
be read in the spirit of the law, especially in relation to carrying out
declared objectives and purposes of the municipal corporation."'
However, it has also been held that the City is bound by the terms
of a contract and thus no different in law than a business corpora-
tion or individual.13
New York City's Corporation Counsel has stated that a "broad"
interpretation of "emergency" would contradict the provisions of
the State Civil Service Law,"' popularly known as the Taylor
Law," which governs the collective bargaining rights of all public
107. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379
N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
108. One court has held that "[tihe only restriction upon such power [the police power
of a city] is that it must be necessary to the protection or promotion of some public interest
or welfare . New Albany v. New Albany St. R.R., 172 Ind. 487, 490, 87 N.E. 1084, 1085
(1909).
109. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(13) (McKinney 1968).
110. An examination of the cases that have challenged MAC and the Control Board
indicates that the answer is "yes." See text accompanying notes 67-72. supra.
111. Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N.Y. 167, 22 N.E. 381 (1889). This case dealt
with a city's right to negotiate an exclusive contract with a water contractor. The court held
that exclusive contracts were against public policy and hence were illegal absent a specific
grant to negotiate such contracts.
112. Greenberg v. City of New York, 152 Misc. 488, 274 N.Y.S. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
113. Whitestone Bridge Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. O'Connell, 14 App. Div. 2d 51, 217
N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dep't 1961). Under this decision the City may be limited in expanding
section 8a-5.0 of the Administrative Code beyond its clear reference to physical disruptions.
114. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, at 30, col. 1 (remarks of Bernard Richland, New York City
Corp. Counsel).
115. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, N.Y. CIVIL SErV. LAW, §§ 200-14
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employees in the State of New York. Others have contended that
since the Taylor Law does not mention removals for austerity pur-
poses, but only those for cause, it is inapplicable to a municipal
fiscal crisis and has no effect on the scope of a city's "emergency"
powers." 6
Much of the case law regarding "powers" during times of crisis
has been formulated without reference to statutory authority."7 An
early case, Lethbridge v. Mayor of New York," ' involved the firing
of a non-civil servant from his civil service position, due to lack of
funds. Ignoring any civil service-non-civil service distinction, the
court held that Charter provisions for removal of public employees
were inapplicable in times of budgetary distress."' Another early
case, Rosenthal v. Travis, " held that even the requirement of giving
notice to discharged employees was suspended if such discharges
were for austerity reasons. The standard used in evaluating such
decisions has been the City's "good faith" in reducing the work force
for lack of funds.'2 '
In the final analysis, the determinative issue may well be
whether a budgetary emergency should have been anticipated at the
time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement., Even
under the Lethbridge and Rosenthal cases, if it can be shown that
a fiscal crisis was not totally unanticipated, the City would not be
allowed to impair existing contracts. The City through its collective
bargaining agreements may have assumed the risk of change in
financial circumstances by not providing for such an emergency in
the contracts. This position was reinforced recently by a decision of
(McKinney 1973), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
116. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, at 30, col. 1 (remarks of Councilman Edward Sadowsky).
117. N.Y. CONST. art. 5, § 6, interpreted in Wipfler v. Klebes, 284 N.Y. 248, 30 N.E.2d
581 (1940).
118. 133 N.Y. 232, 30 N.E. 975 (1892).
119. Id.
120. 169 App. Div. 203, 154 N.Y.S. 403 (1st Dep't 1915).
121. Colligan v. Williams, 91 Misc. 128, 154 N.Y.S. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1915). See also People
ex rel. Corrigan v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 149 N.Y. 215, 225, 43 N.E. 554, 562 (1896).
122. Basically the rationale behind cases allowing austerity measures by a municipality
has been one of "impossibility," defined by one court to be "impracticable," something which
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Transatlantic held that an impracticable con-
tractual obligation can be dismissed if (1) an unexpected contingency occurs, and (2) the risk
of that contingency was not allocated by agreement or custom. Id. at 315. See generally J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-200 (1970).
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New York City's Office of Collective Bargaining forbidding the
Mayor from expanding summer hours for City employees.' 3 That
decision stated that "the situation in which the City finds itself is
not a sudden unexpected happening of the kind normally associated
with the word 'emergency.'""4
On the other hand, Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assis-
tance Corporation indicates that allegations of impairment of con-
tract will be unpersuasive.15 In upholding a moratorium placed on
the enforcement of City notes,' 6 the court relied on Home Building
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell' and subsequent Supreme Court
cases' 8 that have upheld moratoriums on mortgage foreclosures
under a "police power" theory.' 9 The court, while recognizing cer-
tain distinctions in these cases,'10 stated that "there is no doubt that
the same principles apply to the power of the Legislature over con-
tracts made by the subdivisions of the State."'3 ' Thus the court held
that the fiscal crisis which threatened the general welfare justified
the resulting impairment of contracts.'32
The case is significant for two reasons. First, its assumption
that the State may affect contracts entered into by a municipality
would appear to uphold MAC and the Control Board as not violative
of the "home rule" provision of the New York Constitution.'33 How-
ever, Flushing National Bank is certainly not conclusive on this
issue. It is one thing to allow the State to affect municipal contracts
123. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, at 30, col. 3.
124. Id.
125. 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
126. Id. at 985, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
127. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
128. East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co.
v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497 (1965); Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N.Y. 144, 190 N.E. 324 (1934).
129. "Numerous decisions ... repudiated the notion which plaintiff here espouses that
the contract clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1 sec. 10) presents a rigid bar to the protection of vital
public interests, recognizing instead the power, and indeed, the duty of States to prevent the
literal enforcement of contractual terms in order to protect the health, safety or welfare of
their citizens." 84 Misc. 2d at 979, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
130. The line of Supreme Court cases, see cases cited in note 128 supra, involved individu-
als and not subdivisions of the state as did Flushing Nat'l Bank.
131. 84 Misc. 2d at 981, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
132. Id.
133. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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because of "public welfare" considerations; it is quite another to
substitute state agencies for the existing structure of a municipal
government. 4
Flushing National Bank is also significant because of the
court's reverential treatment of the "emergency" theory. The case
will not only be persuasive in challenges to future debt moratoriums
but will most likely influence cases similar to those discussed earlier
concerning layoffs under collective bargaining agreements. 3" One
commentator has criticized the court's line of argument by noting
that Blaisdell and its progeny involved insolvent parties while New
York has a taxing power at its disposal that renders it incapable of
being truly insolvent. 3 ' Whether this distinction is accepted by fu-
ture courts will probably depend on the severity of the fiscal di-
lemma in question.
IV. Conclusion
As more fiscal crises plague American cities, the scope of avail-
able local remedial measures must be defined. The very lack of such
measures is an invitation to state intervention which in turn raises
many constitutional and practical problems. With respect to New
York's experience, it appears that both MAC and the Control Board
go far in eroding traditional notions of home rule and therefore are
vulnerable to constitutional attack. People ex. rel. Town of Pelham
v. Village of Pelham stated that home rule guarantees municipal
officers the right to hold office with customary powers. Certainly it
can be argued that budgetary decision-making comes within the
scope of these powers. At the very least Pelham might require that
city residents elect the three Control Board members currently ap-
134. The court in Flushing Nat'l Bank does seem to emphasize the importance of main-
taining essential services in noting:
Bankruptcy for the City of New York is not only financial disaster for the city but the
note holders . . . would lose interest on their investment and a substantial portion
of the principal as well. The many services that a municipality must provide would
be so depleted as to cause danger to health, safety and the welfare of the public.
84 Misc. 2d at 984, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
135. Under the facts of Flushing Nat'l Bank, impairing a contract appeared to hurt the
public's "health, safety, and welfare." However, if through the elimination of civil service
positions (and impairment of collective bargaining agreements) essential services were dis-
rupted would the court choose the maintenance of services or financial stability? This is the
question that Flushing Nat'l Bank doesn't answer.
136. Brecker, Moratorium Act for the City: Is it Valid?, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Dec. 12, 1975).
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pointed by the Governor or that City officials have a greater voice
in their selection.
The most significant effect of the crisis may well be the exten-
sion of the "emergency" and "police" powers theories that have
been pronounced by New York courts. The precedent set may cause
future courts to take a carte blanche approach to austerity cutbacks
less justified than those presently made. Such a development would
not encourage sound long-term fiscal management by the City.
Joel E. Cohen

